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Taking its cue from Benjamin Constant's famous comparison of the liberty of the ancients 
with that of the moderns, this article examines the compatibility of democracy with free 
markets within the EU. Constant argued that commerce had replaced the political liberty of 
the ancients with the civil liberties of the moderns. Nevertheless, he contended a degree of 
political liberty remained necessary to guarantee these civil liberties. The difficulty was 
whether the political system could operate in the interest of all if modern citizens had ceased 
to identify with the public interest in the manner of the ancients and preferred to pursue their 
private interests. Constant believed representative democracy offered a form of political 
liberty that was compatible with modern liberty. It involved a less demanding view of civic 
virtue to ancient liberty and a different conception of the public interest as promoting rather 
than in conflict with private interests. However, for it to operate as Constant expected 
required certain social and cultural conditions that emerged in European nation states but 
are not themselves the products of commerce and may even be undermined by it: namely, a 
national identity; a social contract; and political parties. The EU involves a further 
deepening of modern commercial liberty beyond the nation state. This article explores three 
main issues raised by this development. First, have any of the three elements that facilitated 
the operation of representative democracy within the member states evolved at the EU level? 
Second, if not, is it possible to create an effective form of representative democracy on a post-
national basis as the logical entailment of the liberties of the moderns? Third, if neither of 
these is possible, can we simply detach modern liberty from political liberty and see social 
rights as attributes of free movement, and efficient and equitable economic regulations as the 
products of technocratic governance? All three questions are answered in the negative. 
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With the euro crisis creating pressures for a fiscal union within the euro zone, the   
compatibility of a free market with political freedom in the EU has become an especially 
pressing issue. The four market freedoms establishing the free movement of capital, labour, 
services and goods define the EU’s core purposes. In many respects, these four freedoms are 
the archetypal ‘modern freedoms’ praised by the French political theorist Benjamin Constant 
in his lecture of 1819 on ‘The Liberty of the Ancients Compared to those of the Moderns’. In 
this article, I shall argue that Constant’s analysis of the passage from ancient to modern 
liberty proves instructive for understanding the contemporary dilemma of how to combine 
market with political freedom in the EU.
 2
 Constant argued that commerce had undermined 
the ancient form of political liberty, that of direct participation. Certain interpreters have seen 
this argument as suggesting an inherent tension between ‘liberalism’ and ‘republicanism’, 
markets and democracy, which is exemplified by the EU (Scharpf 2009: 174-78). They 
contend that – unchecked – the EU’s four market freedoms might undermine democratic 
citizenship within the member states, without being able to create anything as substantial at 
the European level. In their view, the result will be the erosion of the democratically 
constituted social rights and policies typical of these states by EU led pressures for an 
unrestricted free market (Scharpf 2009: 192-98). Yet, Constant maintained that modern 
liberty was compatible with a new kind of political liberty, representative democracy 
(Constant 1819: 325-6). Likewise, some analysts have argued that the  EU can adopt similar 
political arrangements to those found in the member states (Hix 2008), and even that the 
freedoms associated with modern liberty offer a basis for establishing the political rights 
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  The following is not intended as intellectual history – I employ Constant for my own 
purposes. As Foucault responded to critiques of his account of Nietzsche, ‘The only valid 
tribute to thought such as Nietzsche’s is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and 
protest. And if commentators then say that I am being faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche, that 
is of absolutely no interest’ (Foucault 1980). That said, the view presented does appear to 
accord with much recent historical commentary – see Jennings 2009. Jeremy also kindly read 
section 1. 
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typical of  representative democracy on post-national grounds (Habermas 1998: 116-118). 
Indeed, Article 8A of the Lisbon Treaty declares ‘The functioning of the Union shall be 
founded on representative democracy’. However, others believe the EU presages new forms 
of transnational (Benhabib 2008; Kostakopoulou 2008), or supranational citizenship (Majone 
2001) that can detach social from political rights, and the democratic `outputs’ of economic 
equity and efficiency from any democratic ‘in put’. This article explores all these 
possibilities.  
The first section outlines Constant’s classic diagnosis of the shift from ‘ancient’ to 
‘modern’ liberty. It examines why he thought political liberty remained `indispensable’ in a 
commercial age, and regarded representative democracy as compatible with modern liberty. 
As we shall see, though, Constant believed representative democratic institutions could only 
function in cultural and social conditions that are not themselves the products of the civil 
liberties he associated with modern liberty - indeed; they assisted practices that potentially 
undermined these conditions. The second section describes how these conditions facilitated 
the development of representative democracy within European nation states. These states 
combined modern civil and commercial liberties with the representative form of political 
liberty in the manner imagined by Constant. However, this combination involved three 
factors – national identity, a social contract among citizens, and political parties – that all 
modify the individualistic and private character of modern liberty. These factors are shown to 
be largely absent from the EU, raising the question of whether the social and cultural 
conditions exist for the institutions of representative democracy at the EU level to be 
effective.  Some commentators have contended that a new, post-national basis can be found 
for them, others argue that new forms of transnational and supranational citizenship are 
emerging that go beyond representative democracy. The third section investigates these 
possibilities.  I examine three accounts, each of which seeks to do away with one of the three 
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factors highlighted above as necessary for representative democracy at the national level. I 
start with Habermas’s (1996, appendix 2) ‘post-national’ argument that public autonomy can 
be seen as logically entailed by the modern liberty of private autonomy, with a constitutional 
patriotism flowing from individual rights replacing nationalism as a civic bond. I then turn to 
Benhabib’s (2004, ch. 4; 2008) `transnational’ view that ‘freedom of movement’ has de-
territorialised certain social rights, and decoupled them from the reciprocal bonds of 
economic and political participation that ground them in the member states. Finally, I explore 
Majone’s (1996; 2001) technocratic defence of ‘supranational’ forms of non-majoritarian 
governance for certain key EU functions, with party competition replaced by selective 
consultation with experts and civil society groups. I argue all these schemes overlook certain 
key features of modern liberty that Constant identified as making political liberty difficult to 
achieve, yet as necessary as ever. 
 
From Ancient to Modern Liberty 
Constant’s account distinguishes between different conceptions of liberty, the formal 
entitlements and practices that are associated with them, and the social, cultural and 
economic conditions needed to render these entitlements and practices plausible and 
effective. He equated the ancient conception of liberty with collective autonomy and the 
modern conception with individual autonomy (Constant 1819:  310-12) Ancient liberty 
consisted of the political freedom provided by the collective participation of all citizens in 
ruling the polity. Although citizens enjoyed a superior civil status to non-citizens, such as 
slaves or women, their public duties largely extinguished their opportunities for freedom in 
the private sphere. Indeed, private interests were regarded as inherently partial and detracting 
from an attachment to the public good. The political freedom of being ruled by oneself rather 
than by others could only be obtained collectively and through the sacrifice of all personal 
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freedom. Only such total involvement could ensure politics was not captured by particular 
interests and all citizens devoted themselves to the public good. 
By contrast, modern liberty was predominantly civil rather than political, and mainly 
exercised in the private and social sphere. Instead of civic duty, modern liberty encouraged 
individuals ‘to occupy their days or hours in a way which is most compatible with their 
inclinations or whims’ (Constant 1819: 311). It was fostered by individual rights to freedom, 
such as the civil freedoms of conscience, association, speech and movement, and above all by 
the freedoms of contract and property ownership. These last went hand in hand with 
commerce, which had undermined the small scale, slave economies supporting ancient liberty 
and provided the socio-economic conditions favourable to modern liberty.   
Constant welcomed this development as having expanded both the types of freedom 
open to people and the range of social classes who could enjoy them. He also thought the 
spread of modern liberty through commerce had made political oppression less likely. People 
had become more jealous of their private liberty and suspicious of all government rules and 
regulations that might inhibit it. They also looked to trade rather than war to enrich 
themselves, thereby reducing the capacity of rulers to embark on military adventures that 
increased their own wealth and power. Instead, rulers became dependent on private banks and 
taxpayers for their revenues, with their income likewise relying on trade and industry. 
Nonetheless, if ‘individual liberty’ was ‘the true modern liberty’, ‘political liberty is its 
guarantee’ and remained ‘indispensable’ (Constant 1819:  323).  Constant worried that in 
their enjoyment of their private liberties, citizens might neglect and even subvert these 
political guarantees (Constant 1819:  323-4). The difficulty was that the very factors that 
made these guarantees necessary also encouraged their neglect and subversion. 
Though Constant thought all individuals had an interest in the rights associated with 
modern liberty, he appreciated that not everyone necessarily had an equal interest in every 
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one of them or in upholding them on an equal basis for all.  Nor did he think a free market 
would inevitably harmonise each person’s pursuit of their own interest with a similar pursuit 
by every one else in ways that promoted the best interests of all. The particular interests of 
different individuals could and did clash.  Following Adam Smith (Viner 1958; Winch 1978: 
97-98), Constant saw commerce as potentially corrupting from a civic point of view, 
reducing sympathy for others and encouraging cupidity – dangers all too evident in the 
‘monopolizing spirit’ of the mercantile system (Constant 1815: 217-18). Certain political 
structures, not least an impartial legal system, were needed to secure the civil rights related to 
individual liberty and ensure all respected them.  Political mechanisms were also necessary to 
resolve conflicts and solve coordination problems – such as the supply of public goods. One 
solution might be to charge independent administrators with the task of providing these 
guarantees, leaving individuals free to engage in their private pursuits. As he caustically 
observed, it was an offer those in authority were all too happy to make, being `so ready to 
spare us all sort of troubles, except those of obeying and paying!’  However, the Napoleonic 
regime had revealed the error of trusting to self-declared ‘enlightened’ despots.  Tempting 
though this solution might appear to individuals who felt they had better things to do than 
engage in politics, it would be ‘folly’ to hand over political power to any group of people 
without being able to ensure they served the interests of the ruled rather than their own 
(Constant 1819:  326).  
Therefore, a modern form of political liberty had to address the same two key political 
tasks of ancient liberty: namely, to guard against the uncertain virtuousness of the guardians 
of liberty, and to gain the support of the citizenry for certain common rules and regulations. 
Moreover, it had to do so for the self-same reasons as those that had motivated the ancients – 
the concern that politics might be captured by ‘factions’ and  employed for personal gain. 
Even modern liberty required a degree of civic virtue to induce citizens to guard the 
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guardians who provided the political guarantee of their freedom, and to see the necessity for 
such political guarantees in the first place (Constant 1819: 327-8). Yet, this civic virtue could 
not be of the kind associated with ancient liberty. That version had involved the dropping of 
private interests for the public interest. By contrast, to be compatible with modern liberty, 
civic virtue and politics more generally had to be consistent with citizens regarding the 
furthering of their private interests as the main purpose of their freedom.  
Constant contended that representative democracy provided a form of political liberty 
of the requisite kind. It embodied the ‘eternal rights to assent to the laws, to deliberate on our 
interests, to be an integral part of the social body of which we are members’ (Constant 1819: 
324) in a way attuned to the liberties of the moderns. To assent to the laws, citizens did not 
have to be directly involved in decision-making themselves. They elected ‘hired stewards’ to 
do it for them, leaving them plenty of time for their private affairs. Constant saw these 
representatives very much as delegates and stressed the importance of their being directly 
elected to ensure their accountability and responsiveness to the electorate (Constant 1815: 
202, 206). It was as delegates rather than trustees that they were authorised ‘to deliberate on 
our interests’ on our behalf. Representative democracy involved a very different conception 
of the public interest to that associated with ancient liberty. Instead of being distinct from all 
private interests, it was the product of their aggregation and negotiation. The role of 
representatives was to represent the diverse private interests of their electors, and produce 
legislation that responded to their concerns. The general interest could only arise from ‘the 
negotiation that takes place between particular interests’. This required ‘the representation of 
all partial interests which must reach a compromise on the objects they have in common’ 
(Constant 1815: 205). A representative must remain ‘partial towards his own electors’, 
therefore, because the ‘impartiality of all’ only resulted when `the partiality of each of them’ 
was `united and reconciled’ (Constant 1815: 206). The upshot of this system was to make all 
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citizens feel ` an integral part of the social body’. For, each citizen could claim an equal 
responsibility for and stake in the laws given they had been made by their elected 
representatives so as to reflect their interests. In this way, ‘political liberty, by submitting to 
all the citizens, without exception, the care and assessment of their most sacred interests, 
enlarges their spirit, ennobles their thoughts, and establishes among them a kind of 
intellectual equality which forms the glory and power of a people’ (Constant 1819:  327). 
On Constant’s account, therefore, representative democracy retains the links found in 
ancient liberty between self-government, the public interest, and civic virtue, on the one side, 
and liberty, on the other. However, it reworks their rationale and functioning to coincide with 
the modern liberty of individual autonomy, with its focus on social and personal life, rather 
than the essentially political collective autonomy characteristic of ancient liberty. It makes 
politics less onerous and reconceives the public interest in terms of private interests. Yet, 
neither of these features will of themselves overcome the key problem of factionalism, which 
is likely to be an even greater danger under modern as opposed to ancient liberty. Other 
aspects of Constant’s institutional design address this issue to a degree. For example, he 
recommended a clear separation of powers, with an independent judiciary to police 
infringements of basic rights and a constitutional monarch with the power to dissolve 
parliament. But the ‘bastion’ of individual freedom remained ‘the existence of a large and 
independent representation’ (Constant 1815: 289). It alone enables citizens to guard the 
guardians and legitimise the reciprocal modifications to their private interests needed to 
construct the public interest.  
 Constant hoped political participation itself might generate some of the civic virtue 
needed for these tasks. However, it is doubtful it can do so if citizens lack any disposition 
towards public spiritedness in the first place. If individuals are simply concerned to promote 
their own interests as much as possible, then they will remain tempted to free ride on the civic 
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virtue of others, and to devote their own political energies to rent-seeking. Fostering mutual 
dependence through federal arrangements that allowed each local faction to block the self-
interested behaviour of other factions, as he also recommended, will be insufficient to 
promote their common interests efficiently and equitably. It simply invites the universalising 
of factionalism. It will either produce deadlock or generalised rent-seeking by representatives 
attempting to buy the support of their followers, neither of which is likely to be optimal or 
just unless the parties are equal to start with. Even then prisoner’s dilemmas and other 
quandaries of rational choice will arise. To avoid these difficulties, individuals need to be 
disposed to view the exercise of their own private rights in ways that take into account and 
accommodate their similar exercise by others. 
The dilemma had been appreciated as endemic to commercial republics by 
Montesquieu and Smith, on whom Constant drew (Winch 1978: 97-99), as well as the authors 
of The Federalist (Elkin 2006). They too had sought to devise political institutions that 
economised on virtue, while recognising that in politics as opposed to markets private vice 
rarely generates public benefits. However, like other French liberals, Constant was more 
attentive to the role cultural and social conditions play in fostering appropriate political 
attitudes than the Anglo-American tradition has tended to be (Siedentop 1979). He had 
witnessed the failure not just of the French Revolution’s attempt to reinvigorate ancient 
liberty, but also of the Napoleonic attempt to establish an Empire of modern liberty through 
the Code Napoléon against the rise of nationalism. 
Two such conditions underpin Constant’s analysis of representative democracy. First, 
he noted how a shared political culture fosters allegiance both to political institutions and 
one’s fellow citizens. As he remarked, ‘the natural source of patriotism’ was found in ‘a vivid 
attachment to the interests, the ways of life, the customs of some locality’ (Constant1813: 
74). As Mill later argued (Mill 1861: Ch. 16), drawing on Constant and other French liberals 
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(Siedentop 1979: 172-74), such national sentiments make representative democracy possible 
by facilitating public debate in ways that reduce factionalism (Miller 2009: 208-13).  For a 
start, it will be easier to have a discussion among the public as a whole if there are shared 
cultural instruments, such as a common media – newspapers and, nowadays, television and 
radio programmes - that address and are accessible by all, not least because they are in a 
common language all can understand. Such instruments help different sections of society to 
inform and respond to each other. It becomes harder for governments to play them off against 
one another and to pander to sectional rather than public opinions commanding broad 
support. A political culture also supplies shared values that provide citizens with a basis for 
debating matters of collective concern. For citizens and their representatives to feel obliged to 
respond to and accommodate the views and interests of others, they must consider the 
arguments their interlocutors raise are more than private opinions and concerns. A common 
stock of values, that all recognise as important for the political community, aids discussion 
and compromise. It provides agreement on the sorts of points that can be raised and need to 
be addressed and responded to, even if there is disagreement about their relative importance 
and the most appropriate response. In their absence, people will just talk past each other. The 
sharing of values and language can also help build trust among the electorate by highlighting 
common sympathies and priorities. Politics can be less about gaining advantages for one’s 
own group or oppressing rival groups, and more about what set of policies best balances the 
different concerns of individuals so as to achieve the most satisfactory outcome for all. 
Second, similar issues arise if there is a lack of interdependence of interests and 
individuals do not possess a roughly equal stake in the collective decisions affecting them 
(Christiano 2006). These conditions supply both an equal right, as a matter of fairness, for all 
members of the political community to have an equal say in how it is run, and stimulate the 
sort of cross-cutting cleavages whereby people who find themselves opposed on one issue are 
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on the same side on others. Both conditions reduce the prospect of majority tyranny. Though 
people will have a greater interest in some issues than others, everyone involved in politics 
will have a more or less equal interest in the totality of collective decisions. They will be able 
to compromise by trading votes between the issues that matter to them and those that they 
regard to be less important, and will be less likely to be consistent winners or losers as a 
result. This reasoning underpinned the traditional limitation of the vote to property owners, a 
view Constant fully endorsed. He distinguished landed from ‘industrial’ property in this 
respect. Only the former ’binds man to the country where he lives, surrounds his departure 
from it with obstacles, creates patriotism through interest’ (Constant 1815: 218). Land alone 
gave each member of the association ‘a common interest with the other members of the 
association’ (Constant 1815: 214). It signified involvement in common cultural, social and 
economic structures, and a commitment to their future efficient and equitable functioning.  
The moveable ‘industrial’ property of labour and trade was less affected by such structures, 
and its possessors had less of a common interest in supporting them and ensuring they 
operated in a fair way.  
Given the topic of this article, it is significant that Constant regarded the absence of 
these two conditions as a chief failing of the Napoleonic Empire. (Fontana 2002: 126-7). This 
project had endeavoured to unite Europe around the benefits of a uniform model of good 
governance encapsulated in the Code Napoléon. `The same code of law, the same measures, 
the same regulations, and if they could contrive it gradually, the same language, this is what 
is proclaimed to be the perfect form of social organisation’ Constant1813: 73). However, ‘a 
fictitious passion for an abstract being, a general idea stripped of all that can engage the 
imagination and speak to the memory’ could not replace the ‘genuine patriotism’ that springs 
from ‘local customs’ (Constant1813: 73-4). Uniform laws also overlooked local diversity. In 
this respect ‘large states have great disadvantages. Laws proceed from a place so remote from 
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those places where they must be applied, that frequent and serious errors are the inevitable 
result’ (Constant1813: 77).  Good governance needed more than a uniform imposition of the 
rules and rights of private interest. If laws were to be sensitively and impartially applied and 
adhered to, in ways that reinforced public goods while being sensitive to local differences, 
then institutions of political liberty that could draw on shared cultural norms and common 
interests were necessary.  
Though Constant never mentions The Federalist, one can assume that he would have 
regarded its proposals as incompatible with these two preconditions for representative politics 
as the Napoleonic Empire. A large size might aid the checks and balances needed for the 
negative task of blocking factions, as Federalist 10 famously maintained, but – at least within 
Europe - he would have regarded such a solution unavailable. Europe was too diverse for the 
common culture and interests he believed were needed for the positive task of constructing 
and generating allegiance to a shared public interest. In these respects, his conception of 
modern political liberty is more ‘republican’, more concerned to preserve those qualities of 
ancient liberty that ‘achieve the moral education of citizens’ (Constant 1819: 328), than The 
Federalist - hence his preference for an association of European nation states.
 3
  Yet, he 
feared this possibility was endangered not just by Napoleon but also by the corrosive effects 
of commerce, which was turning the European peoples into ‘a great mass of human beings, 
that … despite the different names under which they live and their different forms of social 
organization, are essentially homogeneous in their nature’ (Constant 1813: 52-3). If the 
‘natural’ source of civic pride was local, the danger was such a mass would be little more 
than an agglomeration of self-seeking private individuals. 
The various dilemmas Constant diagnosed as bedevilling the combination of modern 
liberty and democracy are all too evident in the current euro crisis. On the one hand, the 
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 I’m here attributing to him reasoning similar to that of Miller 2008. 
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financial crisis and the high levels of sovereign debt that have resulted from it reveal both the 
need for market regulation and the tendency not to do so when a merchant class with highly 
moveable property and little stake in the polity capture governments (Mair 2011). If 
economies are not socially and politically embedded, they are prone to various forms of 
market failure (Polanyi 1944). On the other hand, the difficulties of getting agreement on a 
suitable rescue package among the euro zone members follows from the type of democratic 
politics that Constant associated with modern liberty, in which agreement requires Pareto 
improvements for all the parties involved. This reasoning will only provide a rationale for 
Germany and the other solvent states to guarantee the sovereign debt of those states likely to 
default so long as it is compatible with enlightened national self-interest as the solution to an 
assurance game. However, if the appeal begins to shift so that it is less to enlightened national 
self-interest and instead to the collective self-interest of the Union as a whole– that is, if the 
sacrifices called for from either the debtor or the creditor states rises beyond a certain 
threshold and look to be uncompensated in the medium or even the long term – then 
cooperation will weaken (Scharpf 1997: Ch. 6) In the view of many national politicians and 
their electorates, it would appear that we are perilously close to this situation – hence the 
tentativeness of the proposals being made to resolve the situation.  The EU has traditionally 
sought to overcome such problems by imposing a non-political solution via the Commission 
or the European Court of Justice, or in this case the European Central Bank. However, such 
solutions are also only likely to prove stable and acceptable in the case of a symmetrical 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which uniform rules and cooperation will benefit all and the problem 
is to avoid free-riding (Scharpf 2009: 183-85, 189-90). A key difficulty with the euro, though, 
has been that the underlying constellation of interests in this case does not conform to this 
pattern. It is not just that certain countries failed to abide by the conditions of the Stability 
and Growth Pact and keep public spending under control, but also that the economies of the 
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participating states have proven too diverse. In other words, Constant’s critique of the 
Napoleonic Empire’s technocratic imposition of uniform norms and regulations apply with 
particular force here. The problems currently confronting the EU are increasingly 
characterised by asymmetric conflicts of interest. In these cases, an appeal to mutual national 
self-interest ceases to be credible and must be to the collective self-interest of the Union as a 
whole – as has occurred in current calls to ‘save the euro’ and with it ‘Europe’.4 Yet, to 
construct a European public interest in these circumstances requires a pan-European 
democratic politics capable of overcoming national self-interest. At this point, the issues 
raised by Constant’s analysis of modern liberty become highly relevant. As I noted, the EU 
upholds the civil liberties necessary for a free market. What remains to be seen is if sufficient 
cultural and social conditions exist at the European level to imbue those who enjoy this pan-
European modern liberty with sufficient elements of the civic spirit of the ancients for a 
political union based on the principle of representative democracy to be possible.  
 
The Modern Union of  Political and Commercial Liberty 
Contrary to Constant’s expectations, commerce did not end military conflict (Wenar, and 
Milanovic, 2009). Representative democracy was only firmly established in Europe after two 
world wars and a third, cold, war. Nevertheless, the liberal democratic states that gradually 
emerged from the nineteenth century onwards could be said to involve precisely the marriage 
he anticipated between political and market freedom. Moreover, he has been proved justified 
in believing that there could be no liberal (civil and commercial liberty) regimes that were not 
also in some meaningful sense democratic (political liberty) regimes too, and vice versa. Yet, 
this modern form of political liberty depended on the two factors Constant had identified as 
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 E.g. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble as reported in The New York Times 18 
November 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/19/world/europe/for-wolfgang-schauble-
seeing-opportunity-in-europes-crisis.html 
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necessary, a common culture and common interests, being preserved in a form he had thought 
potentially incompatible with commercial liberty: namely, nationalism and a social contract 
between unpropertied labourers and those possessing industrial property, plus a third factor, 
political parties, that he had not anticipated. These respectively generated the common values 
and idiom, the alleviation of conflicts of interest, and the creation of ideological rather than 
factional political associations, that were needed to engender enough elements of the public 
spiritedness and social solidarity typical of the citizenry of the ancient polity for the less 
demanding, yet more inclusive, representative democracies to work in ways that promoted 
rather than subverted the public goods appropriate to a modern system of liberty.   
As we saw, Constant feared modern liberty was dissolving cultural differences and 
creating common tastes as well as economic bonds that were transnational in character 
(Constant 1813: 52-3). Yet, a desire for similar consumer products does not seem to have 
eroded national sentiments. Indeed, to some degree the development of unified markets for 
production and exchange promoted nationalism as local practices were replaced by a 
common economic and cultural system tied to a single state (Gellner 1983). These 
economically driven processes of nation building fed into the development of a national 
political demos (Rokkan 1974). The resulting national cultures possess many of the hallmarks 
of ancient liberty in being created by the state, often through compulsory education 
programmes, and stressing a common public bond of a civic kind that is superior to, and 
partly shapes, an individual’s private preferences. They also ensure a shared language or 
languages necessary for a common public sphere. Meanwhile, as he noted, size remains 
important. The representative system can only be stretched so far. Citizens not only rightly 
feel their vote counts for less if a political community gets too big (Dahl and Tufte 1973: 
13ff), but also larger communities tend to be more diverse – culturally, socially and 
economically – making it less likely all have an equal stake in the issues on which they have 
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an equal say, and increasing the chances of persistent minorities and hence of majority 
tyranny (Christiano 2006). 
Second, in addition to cultural bonds, a community of interest among citizens has 
been buttressed by a social contract promoting a degree of reciprocity in economic relations 
(Offe 2000: 67-8). Market rights have been supplemented and constrained by social rights in 
exchange for a willingness to work and pay taxes. Though Constant followed Smith in 
regarding commerce as socially beneficial, like Smith he appreciated its operations might be 
attended by conflicts generated by the large inequalities it promotes in patterns of ownership 
and income (Winch 1978: 98-99; Marshall 1950; Barbalet 1988).  By basing the franchise on 
‘landed’ property alone, he had attempted to exclude the conflict between capital and labour 
from politics, and prevent commercial interests capturing the political process (Constant 
1815: 217). In a commercial world, however, insistence on a landed property qualification 
became increasingly untenable. Meanwhile, mass mobilization in two world wars 
undermined his contention that the ‘patriotism’ required ‘to die for one’s country’ involved a 
lesser commitment to, and understanding of, its interests than possession of land (Constant 
1815: 214). Instead, they prompted the enfranchisement of the unpropertied, with public 
systems of social assurance and education offering an alternative to propertied wealth for 
ensuring a citizen could act and think independently without being dependent on particular 
private interests (Mann 1987). In the process, class conflict was attenuated sufficiently to be 
containable within the democratic system. However, in return, participation in the economy, 
at the very least through being available for work if able to do so, became both a legal 
requirement and an expectation of one’s fellow citizens for those seeking the full social and 
political benefits of citizenship. This expectation that a universal entitlement to social welfare 
will be reciprocated by everyone’s doing their bit to contribute to the welfare of others when 
they can, obtains support in its turn from citizens feeling they belong to a national political 
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community (Miller 1995: 83, 93). Again a degree of commonality has helped both to create a 
social bond and increase confidence that one’s fellows will act justly by you if you act justly 
towards them (Galston 1991: 215-224). 
Finally, Constant shared his contemporaries’ distrust of parties (e.g. Hume 1741: 
Essay 8). However, for a mass electorate, the process of combining the disparate views of 
millions of citizens and bringing them to bear on representatives, while avoiding both 
factionalism and clientalism, has depended on the development of political parties defined by 
ideology or programmes rather than patronage networks or the narrow interests of their 
members, and obliged regularly to compete for power in free and open elections (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967). As early analysts of modern democracies noted (Bryce 1921:119, 
Schattschneider 1942: 1), parties play an ineliminable role in the ‘modern’ form of political 
liberty by channelling the pursuit of private interests in a more public direction, and making 
political participation cost effective in terms of time and effort. Electoral competition forces 
parties to construct coalitions of different interests and unite them behind a programme of 
government to obtain a majority. As a result, different private interests are brought to 
accommodate each other and seek common ground, and so come, in part at least, to shape 
their demands in terms of a broader and more public interest. Parties also economise on the 
time citizens have to give to informing themselves about the merits and failings of their 
potential and actual rulers and the views of their representatives and fellow citizens. Mutual 
criticism by rival parties highlights electorally salient information, while party discipline 
controls and vets representatives.  
However, party competition only tends to work well when those involved are not 
additionally divided by ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural divisions or overly polarised 
by class conflicts: conditions provided by a common nationality and social rights. For these 
factors prevent politics becoming zero-sum and allow ideologically or programme based 
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parties to unite very diverse groups around a number of mutually intersecting concerns that 
cut across cultural and class cleavages. At the same time, as Constant noted, political 
participation helps give citizens a sense of responsibility for and control over these policies, 
with electoral pressures serving to shape national political culture and the social system. Our 
confidence that the laws treat those subject to them in an equitable manner is strengthened 
through their being open to contestation through fair political processes in which each 
citizen’s vote is treated with a reasonable degree of equal concern and respect. 
 Therefore, though contemporary representative democracies are liberal-democratic, 
with the ancient liberty of direct collective political participation transformed by the modern 
liberties of freedom of choice, the exercise of autonomous judgement about how to lead one’s 
life, and the separation of public and private, their practices are shaped by cultural bonds 
Constant feared might be destined to disappear, social bonds he had not imagined as possible, 
and political mechanisms of a  kind he had thought pernicious. All three factors serve to 
constrain the operation of modern liberty in various ways so as to render it compatible with a 
commitment to collective decision-making. Part of the difficulties with establishing any 
degree of political liberty within the EU arises from the fact that the continued unfolding of 
modern liberty appears to have done little to abate the importance of the first factor, while 
potentially making the second and third factors increasingly problematic.  
Far from national and cultural differences decreasing, they have become ever more 
significant. Thus, multinational states, such as Britain, Belgium and Spain, have begun to 
fragment along linguistic, religious and ethnic lines, and been subject to increasing calls for 
self-government on the part of territorially concentrated minority groups and, in certain cases, 
even secession (Kymlicka 2001: 212-13). Cultural criteria have if anything increased in 
importance for those seeking access to citizenship from outside, with many states 
enfranchising non-resident co-nationals while remaining reluctant to grant full citizen rights 
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to resident aliens (Joppke 2001). By contrast, welfare settlements have been under pressure 
since the 1980s from governments influenced by New Right thinking, with global markets 
often invoked as having helped promote such neoliberal policies. Despite some modest 
retrenchments, though, social rights have remained remarkably robust in the face of such 
onslaughts and there is little evidence that globalisation has forced a reduction in welfare 
spending in order to maintain international competitiveness, though some restructuring has 
taken place (Swank 2002: 276). However, what remains strong is the view that welfare forms 
part of a contract between citizens which involves duties as well as rights. Whether justified 
or not, citizens have demanded governments pursue policies that guard against putative 
welfare ‘scroungers’ and have been sensitive to ‘economic’ immigration if that is felt to 
detract from the employment opportunities available to existing citizens or to place additional 
burdens on social services such as housing, hospitals and schools, without any compensating 
gain in tax revenue towards their maintenance and improvement (White 2003: ch. 1). 
Meanwhile, all advanced democracies are witnessing a slow but steady decline in electoral 
turn out, along with a shift towards more focussed – and in certain respects more privatised 
and factional – forms of political participation, as party membership has declined even more 
rapidly than voting (Hay 2007: 12-16). Citizens appear to see politics increasingly through 
the lens of commercial and civil liberty. It is the mechanism through which private interests 
are pursued and individual rights upheld. There has been a commensurate rise in consumer 
groups and single issue movements, particularly in areas such as consumer rights, and the 
increased resort to the law by those with the resources to do so (Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley 
2004: 275-80). Contemporaneously, there has been a move towards the sort of 
depoliticisation Constant feared as citizens have come to distrust politicians and the political 
process. Ever more areas of public life have been handed over to ‘expert’ regulatory bodies of 
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one kind or another that claim to govern on the basis of the ‘public interest’, yet with few if 
any mechanisms for ensuring accountability to the public (Hay 2007: 91-95). 
 All three of these developments pose a challenge for the development of a system of 
representative democracy at the level of the EU.  If national sentiments remain strong for 
defining political membership and the boundaries of the political community, then how can 
the EU compete with such allegiances? Likewise, if social rights are rooted within national 
systems of welfare and solidarity, how can they be disembedded without potentially further 
weakening the bonds of reciprocity among citizens that sustain them? Finally, without the 
support of pan-European cultural or social bonds, how can a European party system develop 
and politics avoid becoming the preserve of myriad pressure groups and depoliticised 
administrative bodies? 
 Unsurprisingly, the EU performs poorly on all three of the factors that have made a 
modern form of political liberty possible in the member states (Bellamy 2008). With regard 
to the first factor of cultural identification, Eurobarometer surveys consistently indicate that 
less than 10% of EU citizens have a strong sense of EU identity, with  only 50% feeling even 
a weak attachment – and that strongly secondary to their local and national ties. 5 Likewise, 
so far as the second factor of social rights goes, opinion polls also show little support for the 
EU taking responsibility for welfare. Issues relating to socio-economic rights, in so far as 
they involve health, welfare and education, all have a low level of legitimacy as EU 
competences, with 65% or more of European citizens regarding these as exclusively national 
responsibilities. Finally, on the third factor of political parties, these exist at the European 
level purely as groupings of national parties within the European Parliament, with the take up 
of EU level political rights at a lower level and declining faster than within the member 
states. Average turn out in elections to the European Parliament runs at below 50% and in 
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many countries are as low as 25%, with each increase in parliamentary power being 
accompanied by a decline in turn out in European elections, which continue to be fought 
largely on domestic issues (Hix and Marsh 2011). Among the 12 million EU citizens resident 
in another member state  turn out is even lower, with the proportion of non-national EU 
citizens even registering to vote ranging from a mere 9% in Greece and Portugal to 54.2% in 
Austria.  
 It might be argued that just because these factors do not exist now does not mean they 
could never exist in the future. However, their emergence within the EU is pre-empted by 
their presence in the member states, while the processes that promoted them there, not least 
war, are unlikely to be repeated (Offe 2003: 73-4; Miller 2008: 145-6). For example, there is 
considerably more diversity on Constant’s two elements of a shared political culture and 
common interests in Europe than in the United States (Baldwin 2009). Views on abortion 
policy are often taken as a proxy for religious and moral values more generally, with the 
United States notoriously divided on the issue. However, if one compares Swedish policy, 
where on average there are over 17 abortions a year per 1000 women, with the far more 
restricted Irish policy, which allows for only 6 abortions a year per 1000 women, then the 
division is as great if not greater. Moreover, despite the spread of English as the lingua franca 
of the educated European classes, a European media has failed to develop even among this 
class. Possibly the only newspapers that enjoy a pan-European readership are the mildly euro 
sceptic Financial Times and the US Herald Tribune. Meanwhile, social differences are 
similarly wide, with the gap between the per capita income of the poorest West European 
country (Portugal) and the richest (Norway) being three times that between the poorest US 
state (Mississippi) and the richest (Connecticut). Thus, in the short to medium term at least, it 
appears doubtful that within the EU modern liberty can be linked to political liberty on the 
same basis as in the member states, as has often been assumed would be necessary for the EU 
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itself to become a ‘representative democracy’ as Lisbon directs (Hoffman 1966: 868). The 
differences on the crucial dimensions are simply too great and have deepened rather than 
diminished over the past 15 years (Shore 2004), despite the dramatic increase in EU 
competencies over this same period. However, others have argued that the novelty of the EU 
lies in promoting new types of citizenship that do not rely on these three factors but are based 
on the civil liberties of the moderns alone. It is to the plausibility of such schemes that I now 
turn. 
EU Citizenship as the Liberty of the Moderns 
EU citizenship can be seen as the archetype of a purely modern conception of political 
liberty. Though only citizenship of a member state gives access to EU citizenship, it does not 
itself relate directly to any of the three factors that led to the establishment of liberal 
democracy within nation states. Instead, citizenship of the Union stems from the four 
quintessentially modern commercial liberties that lie at the heart of the EU – namely, the free 
movement of labour, capital, goods and services. At an early stage, these four commercial 
freedoms became associated with a broader set of civil rights linked to a right to equal 
treatment and the absence of discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article 12 EC) or `sex, 
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation’ (Article 13 
EC). Although initially tied to economic issues such as employment and pay, successive 
judgements of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) came to interpret the commitment to 
equality as an implicit component of any legal system that seeks to take individual rights 
seriously. Following the establishment of the status of Union citizenship in 1992 with the 
Maastricht Treaty, the Court has gradually come to read the four freedoms through the lens of 
Article 18 EC, giving every Union citizen the right to move and reside freely in the territory 
of other member states. By 2001, the Court felt bold enough in one such case – Grzelcyk, 
involving students studying in a different member state to their own - to adopt a rhetorical 
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formula it has regularly employed ever since: namely, that ` Union citizenship is destined to 
be the fundamental status of nationals of the member states, enabling those who find 
themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their 
nationality, subject to the exceptions as are expressly provided for.’6 A number of 
commentators have argued in similar terms, welcoming this new status as signalling the move 
towards a new form of citizenship beyond the nation state (e.g. Kostakopoulou 2008).  
In what follows, I shall explore the plausibility of this attempt to build the political 
and social liberties associated with citizenship on modern commercial and civil liberty alone. 
I shall examine three contrasting accounts, each of which seeks to minimise the need for one 
of the three factors that made the modern form of political liberty possible within the member 
states. Each will be shown to suffer from one or more of the pathologies of modern liberty 
feared by Constant. The first account, provided by Habermas, attempts to create a post-
national identification with the EU through a constitutional patriotism to EU wide rights. Yet, 
his argument ignores both the local roots of civic patriotism noted by Constant and the 
tensions between private and public autonomy that Constant showed lay behind the 
undermining of ancient by modern liberty. The second, transnational account, offered by 
Seyla Benhabib, reflects on how EU citizenship has come to ‘disaggregate’ citizenship rights 
and to ‘deterritorialise’ certain social rights (Benhabib 2004: 153-5; 2008: 46-47). However, 
her enthusiasm for this development overlooks how it generates a commercialisation of 
citizenship that undermines the social contract at the national level that gives rise to these 
rights in the first place. The third, supranational technocratic account of Majone (2001), 
suggests the benefits of political liberty can be provided by proxy and without parties– 
through expert regulators and selective consultation with civil society. Yet, this solution 
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offers an updated version of the Napoleonic version of good governance that Constant 
recognised as more likely to subvert than strengthen liberty. 
Habermas contends EU legitimacy requires the development of a post-national form 
of Union citizenship that derives from identification with European level rights (1996, 
appendix 2), and supported the proposed Constitutional Treaty as a necessary means to 
achieve this result (Habermas 2001a).  To be valid, he believes international law must 
conform to the ‘democratic principle’ by incorporating the preconditions for political 
accountability within it. He sees this incorporation arising through the civil and commercial 
liberties of the moderns providing the new foundations for the liberties of the ancients. 
Indeed, his general theory can be seen as an attempt to unite ancient and modern liberty, 
republicanism and liberalism (see Habermas 1998: 68-9; 2001b: 116-118, where he uses 
these terms, and 1996: 99-104). On the one hand, he argues that private autonomy requires 
social as well as the standard civil rights for its exercise. On the other hand, he contends that 
these self-same rights are the basis for, and can only be legitimised through, democratic 
processes. In this way, civil and civic liberties go hand in hand as mutually entailing each 
other. At the same time, rights can thereby offer an alternative basis for democratic 
citizenship to membership of a national political community, making possible its extension to 
the European and potentially the global level (Habermas 2001b: 98-103).  
There are a number of problems with this thesis, some prefigured in Constant’s 
analysis of modern liberty. Both logically and empirically his linking of private and public 
autonomy is too neat (Christiano 1996: ch. 1; Weale 2007: 106-115; Bellamy 2007: 210-12).  
As Constant noted, there is at the very least a tension between the time and effort that has to 
be devoted to politics and the pursuit of one’s private activities (Constant 1819: 316-7; Weale 
2007: 108). True, it might with some justification be argued that in the circumstances of 
social life private autonomy depends on public regulation. However, this raises the problem 
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that the private autonomy of different citizens may often clash, as may their views as to the 
appropriate public rules and goods needed to uphold and foster it. Such conflicts reflect their 
differing preferences and moral values, and the general difficulties that attend identifying and 
agreeing on what count as good outcomes and the best ways to secure them given the 
complexities and openness of most social processes. R. P. Wolff (1970) showed many years 
ago how to portray public policies and laws as expressions of the autonomous will of the 
people as a whole requires either an implausible account of collective agency or an ethical 
naturalist account of ‘real freedom’ of the kind objected to by liberal critics of ‘positive’ 
freedom. Indeed, many theorists who adopt this approach have a tendency to compile such 
extensive lists of the rights and policies needed to secure the pre-conditions of democratic 
autonomy that one wonders what would remain for citizens actually to decide democratically 
(e.g. Held 1995: 153-56, 190-201). Such accounts seem entirely circular – they obtain a 
spurious democratic legitimacy for their preferred list of rights by so defining democracy that 
it inherently involves them, so that any democratic consideration of their normative 
importance and practical  implications becomes at best unnecessary at worst self-
contradictory.  
These conceptual problems become all the more manifest when one considers how the 
functional and cultural diversity of modern societies multiplies the various spheres of life, 
each with their different guiding values and priorities, and the plurality of moral codes and 
valuations of different individuals and groups of people operating within and between them. 
These processes are themselves the result of modern liberty, yet they increase the potential 
for tensions and conflicts between the diverse activities of citizens and make convergence on 
the preconditions for private and public autonomy even less likely. To these difficulties need 
to be added those linked with the very territorial extent of the proposed post-national political 
communities. As we saw, Constant noted how size matters (Constant 1813:  76-77), 
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diminishing both the impact any citizen feels he or she may make on collective decision-
making and the identification they may have with their fellow citizens (see too Miller 2009: 
212-13).  
What leads a given group of people to coalesce around a particular constitutional 
settlement would appear to be less its intrinsic merits and more a pre-existing belonging to 
the polity and people to which it applies. To quote Constant again (1813: 73-4), patriotism 
does not issue from ‘a fictitious passion for an abstract being’ but ‘a vivid attachment to the 
interests, way of life, the customs of some locality’ (see too Shore, 2004). After all, every 
member state already has its own constitutional settlement which embodies liberal 
democratic values. However, that has not diminished the demand for enhanced self-
government or even secession by national minorities within these states. Why, then, should 
one expect the existence of an EU level constitution to enhance support for the EU?  In fact, 
only 27% of citizens say an EU constitution per se would strengthen European citizenship. 
Indeed, only 32% of Europeans know their rights as citizens and only 43% claim to 
understand what the term ‘citizen of the EU’ means.7 All the peoples of Europe might value 
rights, but they have different valuations of them. Within the member states their 
disagreements in these respects are settled through democratic and judicial decisions that 
reflect a national political culture. However, we saw that take up of EU political rights are 
limited, as is identification with EU level institutions – a circumstance that has led the 
German Federal Constitutional Court for one to question the democratic legitimacy of the 
ECJ and EU law to claim constitutional competence over domestic understandings of 
constitutional rights.
8
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Nevertheless, Habermas is right to fear the disembedding of rights from a functioning 
democratic system that can mesh their private exercise with the public goods that provides 
their rationale (see Raz 1994, ch 3 for this collective dimension of rights). The dangers 
attending such a development emerge clearly from a consideration of the ‘disaggregation’ 
and ‘deterriorialisation’ of rights Benhabib celebrates. As initially designed, Union 
citizenship was supposed to be proof against this arising. Not only is it restricted to citizens 
of a member state but also, the ECJ’s rhetoric notwithstanding , the Treaty insists it must 
‘complement and not replace national citizenship’ (Article 17 (1) EC). Meanwhile, with the 
exception of the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament, the EU itself does not 
provide citizens with goods or services through EU funds or agencies. Rather, what EU 
citizenship offers is access on a par with national citizens to engage in economic activity 
with, and enjoy the services and benefits provided by, another member state. It is only 
activated through a citizen moving to, or trading with, another member state through the 
exercise of the four freedoms. So, Union citizenship does not offer a form of dual citizenship 
with the EU per se. Rather, it allows EU citizens to pursue their commercial liberties on a par 
with nationals of another member state to their own. Moreover, certain ‘limitations and 
conditions’ were instituted to protect various non-market liberties associated with national 
citizenship. Thus, the 1990 Residence Directives, later repealed and incorporated into Article 
7 (1) b and c of Directive 2004/38, together with certain provisos of what are now Articles 
39, 43 and 49 EC, restrict the right of residence to those engaging in economic activity or 
possessing adequate funds not to become a burden on the national system of social assurance 
and covered by sickness insurance. The four freedoms also do not apply in areas that are 
‘wholly internal’ or involve restrictions based on public policy, security and health (Uecker9). 
Recently, though, these limitations have been implicitly and explicitly challenged by ECJ 
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rulings to the effect that Union citizenship offers a Treaty based, directly effective right of its 
own. It is these decisions that have fleshed out a form of market citizenship at the EU level 
that potentially conflicts with political and social citizenship at the member state level 
(Everson 1995). 
In a series of cases, the Court has increasingly argued that the restrictions protecting 
national citizenship have to be applied in a ‘proportional’ manner (Baumbast10) that do not 
deprive Union citizens of  a right to move and reside that exists independently of their pursuit 
of any economic activity (Chen
11
), thereby creating new rights for non-workers (Sala
12
, 
Trojani
13
),  students (Grzelczk) and job-seekers (Collins
14
), weakening public interest 
derogations that excluded non-nationals from certain public service jobs ( Marina Mercante 
Espanola 
15), and altering what could be considered a ‘wholly internal’ matter (Avello16, 
Chen. Rottmann
17
,  Zambrano
18
, although see McCarthy
19
 which arguably reasserts the 
internal rule). In a parallel move, the Court has also questioned the previous understanding 
that the state provision of healthcare and education are not ‘services’ in the commercial sense 
of Articles 49, 50 EC, but legitimately correspond to the democratically decided collective 
preferences of the citizens of each of the member states, reflecting national financial priorities 
and other public interest considerations (e.g. Commission v. Austria,
20
 Humbe
21
l). As such, 
these services had not been subject to the prohibition on restrictions of the freedom to provide 
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services. However, decisions such as Swartz
22
, Kohll
23
, Geraets-Smits
24
, Mueller-Faure
25
, 
and Watts
26
 have undermined this reasoning by allowing individuals to escape national 
processes of rationing these goods by shopping for alternatives elsewhere in the Union. 
Grzelczyk  held that ‘a certain degree of financial solidarity’ now existed between the 
member states. Yet, though the euro crisis suggests that such solidarity is decidedly limited, 
the Court has consistently refused to treat national fiscal concerns as posing restrictions on 
the exercise of European liberties – even treating national rules against tax avoidance as 
violations of free capital movement. Finally, there have been a series of judgments that have 
prioritised EU level economic freedoms over member state level social rights (Viking
27
, 
Laval
28
, Rueffert
29
 and Luxembourg
30
). In these cases, the Court has attempted to impose a 
uniform, minimum standard of wage legislation that overrides local collective bargaining 
agreements, thereby hindering the exercise of union rights. 
In various ways, these decisions uncouple the rights of individuals freely to pursue 
their personal goals and interests on an equal basis to others either from economic 
participation within and a contribution to, or membership of and identification with, the 
polity in which one resides (Scharpf 2009: 191-198). Consequently, many citizenship rights, 
including access to important social and economic benefits, have been disassociated not just 
from political citizenship, but also from what we have seen have become the standard 
prerequisites for obtaining the same: namely, an economic stake in the fortunes of the state, 
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membership and a degree of identification with it, and political participation in shaping and 
sustaining the goods that it provides its citizens. It is this process that has produced what 
Benhabib calls the disaggregation of citizenship (Benhabib 2008: 46-47), whereby the 
synthesis of civic with commercial and civil liberties achieved within the nation state has 
been pulled apart as the latter have become detached from the three factors we identified as 
linking them to the former. Instead, modern commercial liberties have become the trigger of 
themselves for access to certain civic liberties: notably, the ability to vote and stand in local 
and European elections when residing in another member state, and admission to social 
benefits that hitherto have been both privileges of political citizenship and part of their 
foundation.  
Although an advocate of ‘another cosmopolitanism’, Benhabib’s transnational 
position shares the general cosmopolitan endorsement of such moves as following their 
critique of the moral arbitrariness of borders, and the exclusionary nature of state centred 
citizenship (Carens 1987; Nussbaum 1996). Even though many, if not all, these rights apply 
only to EU nationals rather than all non-citizens resident within a member state, and to that 
extent are unsatisfactory, cosmopolitans are apt to regard any deterritorializing and 
denationalizing of citizenship as a step in the right direction. However, there is a split within 
the cosmopolitan camp over what universal obligations we owe to all humans, and the 
mechanisms that might be necessary to uphold them. Libertarians see the liberties of the 
moderns in largely negative terms, as merely necessitating the removal of barriers that 
interfere with free exchanges between individuals (Kukathas 2003: 572). On this view, there 
was little need for Union citizenship as a social or political status – it was sufficient to uphold 
the four freedoms as inherent aspects of a ‘common market’, avoiding welfare and political 
rights as creating potential distortions with its free operation while supporting the possibility 
of economic migration from poor to rich countries as consistent with a genuinely free market 
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in labour. By contrast, more socially minded cosmopolitans have argued that rich countries 
also have more positive obligations towards the poor (e.g. Pogge 2008). Theorists differ as to 
how far these extend, but most contend some redistribution is warranted given that the wealth 
of the rich depends in part on their having exploited the  resources of the poor and deployed 
their superior bargaining position to gain favourable terms of trade.  
The quandary confronting social liberals, though, is that the institutional capacity for 
securing the libertarian, market-reinforcing view of the liberties of the moderns is far greater 
than that for implementing the market-correcting view they favour. As Fritz Scharpf has 
noted (1999: 54-58), ever since Cassis de Dijon
31
 the ECJ has effectively constitutionalised 
free competition within the EU, overriding the political judgement of national legislatures on 
the reasonableness of their environmental, health and safety, and other regulations whenever 
it felt they lacked an adequate public interest defence. The opening up of the full range of 
public services to competition, so that Union citizens may choose from a range of providers, 
is simply an extension of this logic. Yet, this possibility potentially undermines the social 
contract within each of the member states without establishing any at the EU level (Scharpf 
2009: 198). For example, the decision in Watts simply enables those citizens who are 
sufficiently mobile and proactive to seek a given health treatment in another member state to 
jump the waiting lists and other restrictions that national services employ to prioritise the 
spending of limited resources among different kinds of health care (Newdick 2006). As such, 
it certainly enhances the ‘modern liberty’ of those citizens able to take advantage of this 
option. But, given that national budgets are not infinitely elastic; their doing so may be at the 
expense of the health or other social needs of many of their fellow citizens. Moreover, these 
other individuals are not in a position to contest such Court decisions through the political 
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system. Instead, their collective civic liberty has been undercut by this extension of an 
essentially commercial liberty.  
 Benhabib appears to acknowledge this dilemma in seeking to distinguish the ‘human 
rights’ claims  made by refugees, asylum seekers and migrant workers from the deregulatory 
legal framework promoted by global capitalism – what she calls the lex mercatoria 
(Benhabib 2007: 22, 33). Yet, this theoretical argument overlooks how in practice the 
language of the first has often been deployed to legitimise the second. Like others (Caporoso 
and Tarrow, 2008; Kostakopoulou 2008, Kochenov 2011) she has seen the Court’s extension 
of rights to free movement and to non-discrimination on the basis of nationality to those 
outside the labour market as marking a move from its market bias to one based in rights. She 
argues they reflect a cosmopolitan duty of ‘hospitality’ that, in time, ought to enable migrants 
from poor countries to gain access to the social rights of wealthier states (Benhabib 2008: 22-
23, 36). However, in many respects the Court has simply deployed the language of human 
rights to further extend its market logic. By portraying the negative rights associated with 
market-reinforcing liberties as extensions of humanitarian duties not to unduly interfere or 
exploit others and to uphold basic rights, it has been able to overcome all democratic 
objections on the part of the member states. These have not been examples of ‘democratic 
iterations’ as Benhabib claims (2007: 33), but rather a means to trump national exercises of 
self-determination (Scharpf 2009: 193). 
The difficulties of extending positive rights on the basis of free movement are both 
normative and practical. Normatively we incur such obligations to our fellow citizens through 
being associated with them within a given political system that possesses the capacity to 
determine and compel obedience to the rules governing our social and economic interactions 
with each other. Through the exercise of our civic liberty we are co-responsible for these 
rules, and so have a mutual obligation to ensure they operate in as equitable and impartial 
 
  
34 
manner as possible. We also help sustain them through our economic activity and taxes. 
However, if we can claim these rights without incurring the related obligations, say by 
forcing my fellow citizens to pay for a service in another country that as a result of collective 
decisions in which I could and probably did participate is unavailable or less available to me 
in my country of full citizenship, then this social and political compact is undone. 
Meanwhile, citizens do not exist in such relations with non-citizens. International 
organisations – even highly developed ones such as the EU – have limited powers and are 
authorised not by citizens directly but by their states. They are voluntary agreements to 
pursue certain circumscribed common purposes for the mutual benefit of the parties 
concerned. Cosmopolitans are sometimes inclined to suggest that we should create global 
institutions capable of treating all individuals equally, given that membership of any given 
state is a mere accident of birth - and even, somewhat contentiously given its continued 
intergovernmental character and manifest democratic failings, to view the EU as 
demonstrating the possibility of such schemes (e.g. Held 1995: 111-13, 254-55; Cohen and 
Sabel 2006). However, this proposal confronts the normative problem of already existing 
states. As a matter of consistency, our enjoyment of the rights of citizenship may imply a 
duty to ensure that everyone can also enjoy this right. Yet, the right of everyone to be a 
citizen of some state does not entail that we all must be citizens of a global state or federation 
of states. Indeed, the continued role played by national political cultures in defining the 
boundaries of citizenship, and the problems of establishing effective political mechanisms 
within large scale, multinational political systems, suggests the attempt to do so would be ill-
fated (Sangiovanni, 2007). 
Certain analysts have suggested that these concerns with EU democracy and its 
impact on welfare policies are misplaced. The legal regulation required to uphold the market 
rights that form the EU’s core business is both uncontroversial, given that it is Pareto-
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efficient and reflects common interests, and best administered by expert, technocratic bodies 
that are immunised from potentially distorting political interferences (e.g. Majone 2001; 
Moravcsik 2002). Such matters are of low electoral salience and often depoliticised even 
within the member states. However, this argument raises Constant’s main worry regarding 
the ‘liberty of the moderns’: namely, that individuals will be tempted to delegate their safe-
keeping to ‘Enlightened’ rulers promising to act on behalf of public utility (Bellamy 2010).  
As he noted, such schemes have three main weaknesses: they offer no safeguard 
against factionalism; they fail to encourage a patriotic identification with public policies; and 
offer no means for ‘guarding the guardians’. All three apply here. First, regulators have no 
incentive to respond to the concerns of the public, and no effective mechanism for gathering 
information on what those concerns may be. Constraining the access of the general public 
raises the risk of regulators being ‘captured’, or unduly influenced, by certain sectoral groups, 
and producing policies that are inequitably and possibly inefficiently partial to those interests 
(Coen and Thatcher 2005).  
Second, there is a danger that citizens will lack a sense of ownership of these 
regulations, disputing their point even when they are in their own interests, and become 
alienated from those who uphold them. The fact that less than 50% of citizens think ‘EU 
membership is a good thing’ – not just in Eurosceptic Britain (where only 33% think it good 
and 25% regard it as ‘bad’) or Finland (36% ‘good’, 25% bad), but also in traditionally 
Europhile nations such as France (44% good) -  sits ill with the view that civic engagement is 
unnecessary for the EU’s legitimacy so long as the ‘outputs’ provided by the independent 
technocracy are themselves legitimate.
32
  Moreover, it is disputable precisely how 
uncontentiously win-win market-making regulatory policies are – even taking into account 
the compensation offered by the Social Fund and other mechanisms to overcome short-term 
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costs for particular groups. As Majone acknowledges, redistributive policies do require more 
democratic legitimacy than purely regulative ones (Majone 1996: 294-96).  For in these cases 
it is likely to prove even harder to get citizens to buy into the provision of public goods that 
may appear prima facie to conflict with their personal exercise of their civil and commercial 
liberties.  
Finally, this argument overplays the domestic analogy, underestimating the ways 
elected politicians control non-majoritarian regulatory bodies in the member states. The 
autonomy of domestic regulatory bodies is generally limited by various screening and 
sanctioning mechanisms that allow the political principals to control their technocratic agents. 
Though many formal instruments appear too costly and arduous to employ with any 
regularity, potentially impugning the neutrality of the agency and thereby undermining its 
chief asset, or risking associating the political principals with any failure, a range of less overt 
and informal measures prove as effective. By selecting friendly yet independent experts, with 
no direct party or other link to government, and managing the effectiveness of the body 
through their hold on information or role in implementing its recommendations, politicians 
can shape the institutional incentives in such ways that regulators propose congenial policies 
(Thatcher 2005: 347). At the EU level, the plurality of principals and the ability of the 
Commission to develop a complex network of overlapping agencies, all reduce this influence 
while introducing the dangers of conflicting forms of accountability. Moreover, the 
possibilities for regulatory capture are increased by the closeness of EU regulation to various 
‘stakeholders’ – notably business and unions (Coen and Thatcher, 2005: 341-2). Domestic 
regulators also come under diffuse public pressure from the media and other organs of the 
national public sphere – a pressure that is far harder to exert at the EU level given the virtual 
absence of a pan-EU public sphere. One can hardly regard monetary policy as of low 
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electoral salience, yet the European Central Bank is far more independent from public and 
political opinion than any of its member state equivalents. 
Some analysts argue that these difficulties can be overcome by selective consultation 
with an emerging European public formed of transnational civil society groups (Sabel and 
Zeitlin 2007). Yet, in the absence of shared identities, reciprocal social relations and proper 
parties, the political liberties pursued by Union citizens are of a markedly individualistic 
rather than a collective kind (Scharpf 2009:176-78). They consist of special interest and 
single issue groups and court actions that typically seek benefits for the individuals 
themselves and their supporters, while transferring the costs onto others (Warleigh 2006; 
Kroger 2008; Harding 1992) These channels invariably promote rather than counterbalance 
factionalism and rent seeking (Olson 1974). 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has employed Constant to explore the problems and necessity of combining the 
commercial liberty of the moderns with a viable form of political liberty that possesses 
certain key qualities of the liberty of the ancients, albeit in a new guise. Section 1 discussed 
Constant’s argument that representative democracy provided the solution. He believed it 
economised on civic virtue sufficiently to be compatible with the liberty of the moderns, 
while offering a mechanism for securing that liberty on an equal basis for all citizens that 
could guard against free riding and rent seeking by rulers and ruled alike. However, he also 
thought representative democracies would only operate in this way provided citizens shared a 
political culture and had an equal stake in political decisions.  Section 2 described how these 
conditions came to be met within nation states thanks to nation building, a social contract 
among citizens and the development of political parties. It also showed these three factors to 
be absent from the EU – a possibility Constant had himself foreseen in his critique of 
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Napoleonic Empire. Section 3 then looks at Union citizenship as an example of basing civic 
rights on the civil and commercial liberties of the moderns alone, without any of the 
conditions that have rendered them compatible with political liberty within the member 
states. I argued that Constant’s fears have turned out to be well founded. Of themselves, these 
liberties cannot generate the civic bonds needed for representative democracy. However, 
shorn of the reciprocal bonds and constraints that such collective decision-making generates, 
Union citizenship confers rights without responsibilities. It risks unpicking welfare 
arrangements within the member states without having the capacity to generate them at the 
EU level, while encouraging a form of politics that benefits organised special interests rather 
than the public interest – be it that of each member state or of Europe as a whole. The euro 
crisis has been seen by many as an opportunity to push forward with both fiscal and political 
union (Duff 2011). Whether or not circumstances require such dramatic changes lies outside 
the scope of this paper.  What has been suggested, however, is that there are both 
considerable socio-cultural obstacles to subjecting the market driven economic imperatives 
behind this policy to democratic controls at the EU level, and that such control is essential if 
the economic liberties of the moderns are not to result in the self-defeating pursuit of private 
benefits at the expense of various public benefits – including the collapse of the market itself. 
If, as Constant’s thesis suggests, there are democratic limits to European unification, then 
further economic and political integration may risk compounding market failure with political 
failure. It might be preferable to limit both political and economic cooperation to those tasks 
achievable by his preferred option of a union of democratic European nation states. 
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